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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




M.D. HALTOM and MICHAEL 
S. TANNER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
CASE NO. 14832 
and 
CASE NO. 14844 
Respondents, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bernice Schwartz 
commenced an action against the Appellants alleging a violation 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and fraud regarding the sale 
of a home by Mr. and Mrs. Schwartz. After a trial before the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,Jr., Judgment was entered against 
Defendants, Stan Tanner, Michael S. Tanner and M.D. Haltom. 
Appellants, Michael S. Tanner and H.D. Haltom have appealed 
from said Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was entered in favor of Respondents against 
Appellants, Michael S. Tanner and M.D. Haltom, and Defendant, 
Stan Tanner, in the sum of $40,643.00 as damages and $7,500.00 
as attorney's fees based upon Respondents' fraud, deceit and 
statutory action under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants are requesting this Court to reverse the 
findings and reverse and vacate the Judgment entered by the 
Trial Court and for costs of this action herein incurred. Res-
pondents request that this Court affirm the Trial Court's find-
ings and Judgment and for costs of this action herein incurred. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bernice Schwartz 
were the owners of real property located at 1792 Millbrook Road, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which was listed for sale 
(T. 14); that pursuant to said offer of sale, Respondent, Daniel 
M. Schwartz was contacted by Appellant, M.D. Haltom on December 
8, 1968 at the San Francisco Airport (T. 15); that during the 
course of said meeting, Appellant, M.D. Haltom made represen-
tations of a pending merger of Bishop Industries and United 
Equities on a three-to-one or four-to-one ratio,of an ac-
quisition of a 915,000 acre buffalo ranch.of uranium properties, 
Scotty Auto Service Center, representations that Jiffy John had 
been approved by the Los Angeles Smog Control Board; that there 
were 5,000,000 shares of stock which could be purchased at 
$3.00 per share; that Western States Capitalization was 540,000 
shares at $1.00 per share, and that Mr. Stan Tanner, the prin-
c i pal of r1 r . M . D . Hal tom was w i l l i n g to pl edge shares of said 
stock and issue a note so that the property owned by Respondents 
could be transferred free and clear of liens (T.18, 21, 22, 23, 
24 and 25). Respondent, Daniel Schwartz was advised by 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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M.D. Haltom that he had first hand knowledge regarding the 
representations of the various companies for which stock was 
to be placed in escrow to secure a note on the property in 
question (T.82 and 83). That Appellant, M.D. Haltom had on 
several occasions represented that the home which was to be 
purchased by Stan Tanner for his son, Michael S. Tanner was 
to be free and clear of all liens (T.24 and 91). Respondent 
attempted to make an independent check on United Equities' stock 
through a stock broker and have a check on Mr. Krueger's 
credit, who was reported to have been the President of United 
Equities (T.65 and 67). 
In reliance upon M.D. Haltom's representations re-
garding the value of the stock which was to be placed as 
security, Respondents decided to go forward with the sale of 
the property in question to Stan Tanner (T.45, 53, 54 and 59). 
That on January 2; 1969, Stan Tanner personally executed and 
delivered to the Respondents a promissory note in the principal 
sum of $40,643.00 with interest and the note was secured by a ple~: 
of 10,000 shares of common stock of Bishop Industries and 20,000 
shares of the common stock of Western States Land. (Exhibit "5d") 
That as additional consideration for the sale of the home in 
question, Stan Tanner, on the 2nd day of January, 1969, granted 
an option for the purchase of Bishop Industries, Inc. stock 
(T.36, Exhibit "4"). That based upon said representations of 
M . D . Ha l tom a n d the o pt i o n , a l~ a r r n a t y Deed w a s i s s u e d b Y the 
Respondents to Appellant, Michael S. Tanner and Louise 
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Tanner (T.43, Exhibit "6"). 
The Appellant, Michael S. Tanner testified that in 
November of 1968 he came to Salt Lake City to look for suit-
able homes for his family and to take a position in his father's 
organization (T.166 and 167). He further testified that any 
property would have to be transferred to him without a mort-
gage (T. 166); that on the 20th day of February, 1969, prior to 
the Appellant, Michael S. Tanner moving into the residence in 
question, a mortgage was issued to Milne Truck Lines (T.172 
and 173, Exhibit "17"), and that the bulk of the proceeds as 
the result of said mortgage was tendered to Jenifer Day, a 
corporation which was owned by Michael S. Tanner's father and 
stepmother, and, Michael S. Tanner had an interest in said cor-
proation at one time (T.162 and 178). That Michael S. Tanner 
lived in the home for a period of approxiamtely one year, at 
which time he moved out (T.181). 
Defendant, Stan Tanner, defaulted on the payment of 
the promissory note in question and Alvin I. Smith, as an escrow 
agent, attempted to find a market for the sale of the stock in 
question, but was unable to find a market for the stock and 
was advised by Appellant, .iichael S. Tanner, that there was 
no market for the stock in question (T. 139 and 142). 
The buffalo deal, which was represented as being 
placed in escrow by Appellant, M.D. Haltom, on December 8, 1968, 
did not materialize (T.207): the merger never occurred, (T.215) 
and there was a dispute with the Jiffy. John contract (T.190 and 
19 l ) . Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The Trial Court entered Judgment in favor of Res-
pondents, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bern1·ce L s h 
· c wartz against 
Defendants, M.D. Haltom, Stan Tanner and Michael s. Tanner for 
$40,643.00 damages and $7,500.00 attorney's fees (R.80). The 
Court also awarded damages against Stan Tanner for $21,870.Zg 
as interest on the aforementioned note (R.80). 
PO INT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE RESPON-
DENTS IN THE LOWER COURT TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMErH. 
Sufficient evidence was presented on a trial of the 
issues to establish the liability of Appellants, M.D. Haltom 
and Michael S. Tanner. 37 C.J.S., Fraud § 61 at pp. 347, 348 
states: 
"However, the circumstances may be such as to impose 
liability for representations made by others, as 
where parties jointly participate in defrauding 
complainant. This is especially true where there 
was a conspiracy to defraud, but it is not essen-
t i a 1 to 1 i a b i 1 i t T th a t ___ there s ho u 1 d ha v e been s u ch 
a conspiracy." emphasis added 
The transcript, when viewed favorable to the Res-
pondents, clearly indicates that there \vas a systematic program 
of obtaining the property in question without a mortgage lien. 
Ho1-1ever, before the Appellant, Michael S. Tanner moved into 
the property, the same was mortgaged and the proceeds tendered 
to a corporation over which he had previously been associated 
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The Utah Supreme Court indicated in the case of 
Greenwell v. Duvall, 9 U.2d 89, 338 P.2d 118 (1959) that clear 
and convincing evidence is necessary only where the moving 
party is attempting to set aside a written agreement and that 
where no written agreement is involved, only a preponderance 
ot the 0 vidence is necessary. The Utah Supreme Court in Lamb 
v j)_a_11_g_a__r_t, 526 P.2d 602 (1974), at p. 609 in explaining Child 
y-'-_i,Jli__l __ d, 8 U. 2d 261, 332 P.Zd 891 (1958) in regard to a fraud 
action states: 
if the evidence appears to be such that reason-
able minds acting fairly.reasonably and in good 
conscious could be regarded as clear and convincing 
as the ordinary meaning of these words imply, the 
findings should not be disturbed. The findings and 
Judgment should not be disturbed unless the court 
can say affirmatively and with some degree of assur-
ance that there is no reasonable basis in the evid-
ence that could fairly and rationally support the 
requisite degree of proof, i.e., by clear and con-
vincing evidence." 
The Court, in reviewing the evidence is obligated to 
review the evidence in a light most favorable to Respondent's 
!'Ost1tion. The Court, in Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 U.2d 
378, 423 P.Zd 659 (1967), at p. 662 states that the Court must: 
" ... take the evidence in a light most favorable to 
plaintiffs (prevailing party) position, as we are 
obligated to do on this review." 
This stateMent is supported in Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
l_Ux lo r 1'· , 2 7 U . 2 d 1 8 8 , 4 9 3 P . 2 d l 2 8 3 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
S Coul·t ,·n Lund v. Phillips Petroleum fhe Utah upreme _ 
Co_c.• F! L..Zrl 276, 351 P.Zd 952 (1960), at p. 954 stated: 
"To be sustainable in lav1 the verdict need only 
fall within the orbit so that it can be said that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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there is substnatial evidence from which reason bl 
minds could believe the facts." a e 
A general proposition regard1"ng th ff" · e su 1c1ency and 
weight of evidence is stated at 30 Am Jur 2d 
, Evidence, § 1080, 
p. 226. 
" ... evidence i~ sufficient or satisfactory if it is 
such as to satisfy an unprejudice mind of the truth." 
After reviewing the transcript in question, it is 
evident that there is sufficient evidence to support the Trial 
Court's findings and Judgment in favor of Respondents, against 
the Appellants in this case. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENTS, or~ A TRIAL OF THE ISSUES, PROVED THE 
ELEMENTS OF STATUTORY FRAUD AGAINST THE APPELLANTS. 
The Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 61-1-22 (l)(b) states: 
"any person who 
(b) offers or sells a security by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they are made, not misleading 
(the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), 
and who does not sustain the burden of proof that 
he did not know,and inthe exercise of reasonable care 
could not have been known, of the untruth or omission, 
is liable to the person buying the security from him, 
who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest at six percent per year from the date of 
payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees~ less 
the amount of any income received on the secur1!Y• 
upon the tender of the security or for damages if 
he no longer owns the security. Damages are the 
amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less 
the value of the security when the buyer disposed 
of it and interest at six percent per year from the 
date of disposition. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(2) Every_person who directly or indirectly controls 
a s~ller liab~e under subsection (1), every partner, office~, or d~r~ctor of such a seller, every person 
occupying a similar status or performing similar 
functions, every employer of such a seller who mater-
ially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or 
~g~nt who materially aids in the sale are also liable 
Jointly and severally with and to the same extent as 
the seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable 
sustains the burden of proof that he did not know 
andin exercise of reasonable care could not have ' 
known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which 
the liability is alleged to exist. There is con-
tribution as in cases of contract among the several 
persons so liable." 
Section 61-1-13 (lO)(a) states: 
"The words, 'sale', or 'sell' include every contract 
of sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a 
security or interest in a security for value." 
Section 61-1-13 (lO)(f) states: 
"The terms defined in this subsection do not include 
(i) any bona fide pledge or loan ... " (emphasis added). 
In reviewing the transcript in question, it does 
I 
qppear that the stocks which were deposited in escrow with 
Ajvin l. Smith were placed in escrow as a pledge for the note. 
~owever, an option was also granted to purchase stock as addit-
ional consideration (Exhibit "4", T.36). Also, the statute 
uti]izes the qualifying language of bon~ fide pledge or loan 
and the Utah Supreme Court in Guarantee Mortgage Co. v. Flint, 
66 U.128, 240 P. 175 (1925), at p. 136 adopts the language of 
37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit, Section 12 at page 33 which 
states: 
"The 1 a 1~ re qui res good fa i th i n ever~ bus i ~es s 
transaction, and does not allow one ~ntentionally to 
deceive another by false representatio~s or.conceal-
ments and if he does so, it will require him to 
make good such representations .... " 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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And the transcript herein clearly indicates that good 
faith was not involved in the transaction with the Respondent 
as shown by the representations made by Appellant, M.D. Haltom 
(T.18, 21, 22, 23 and 24) and the fact that the Appellant, 
Michael S. Tanner mortgaged the home prior to moving into the 
same and tendered the money to a corporation controlled by his 
father, (T. 173) after having made statements that the home 
would have to be transferred without a mortgage (T.166). 
The Fedea rl Court, in Securities & Exchange Commission 
v. Guild Films Co., S.D. N.Y. 178 F. Supp 418 (1959), in attempt· 
ing to determine bona fide or good faith, at p. 423 stated: 
"The touchstone to the transaction is the good faith 
of the parties. A good faith consisting not of an 
absence of intent to evade the statute, but an 
absence of intent on the part of the one delivering 
the proprty that it be sold and an absence of intent 
on the part of the one receiving it at the time he 
receives the property to sell it." 
An option was granted for the sale of certain securit· 
ies and certain securities were pledged as security for the note, 
the pledged securities could be sold in the event of a default on 
the note and in the present case, a default did occur. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Combined Metals Reduction Co., et al. v. State 
Tax Commission, 111 u. 156, 176 P.2d 614 (1947) at page 616 
adopted Webster's New International Dictionary definition of 
bona fide as: 
"being in or with good faith; without fraud or deceit .. · 
and as shown by the sections of the transcript quoted above, 
an ab Se n c e of good fa i th i n their Appellants clearly indicated 
transactions with Respondents. The Utah Supreme Court in i_!l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Supply Company v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (1974) in reference to 
Utah Code Annotated, 61-1-22 at pp. 220,221 stated, 
"That its objective was to moderate the requirements 
of common law fraud and the difficulties involved 
in its proof, by imposing a higher standard of ethics 
and ~esponsibility upon the sellers of securities and 
p~ac1ng upon them the affirmative duty of making full 
disclosure of all material facts; and a concomitantly 
it is intended to reduce the buyer's burden of inves-' 
tigation and inquriy, and make it easier for him to 
obtain redress on the basis of deception. Under which 
provisions, a buyer need only show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that in making the sale, the Seller 
made an untrue statement or omission concerning the 
material fact and that the buyer did not know the 
untruth or omission. And, an aspect of this statute 
important to note, is that when the buyer has done 
so, the statute does change the burden of proof by 
expressly requiring the seller to show that he ... 
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable 
care could not have known, of the untruth or omission." 
The Appellant, M.D. Haltom, indicated that he had 
first hand knowledge of the representations made to Respondent 
(T.82 and 83) and the Appellant, Michael S. Tanner, having full 
knowledge of the prior transactions borrowed against the equity 
in the real property by the mortgage executed on February 20, 
1969 and transferred proceeds of the loan to a corporation 
controlled by his father, Co-Defendant, Stan Tanner (T.172 
and 173). 
Louis Loss on Securities Regulation, Volume I 2d 
Edition (1961 ), when referring to exempted transactions commenc-
ing page 645, makes a distinction that the pledge or sale must 
be bona fide and as clearly shown by the transcript in this case, 
the pledge and the option were not bona fide pledges for the 
security of the note. 
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Porrn III 
THE RESPONDENTS SUSTAINED THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF JN 
REGARD TO COMMON LAW FRAUD. 
The Court, in Pace v. Parish, 122 U.141, 247 P.2d 
273 (1952) established the following requisites for common law 
fraud and taking the evidence in a light favorable to Respondent, 
it is clearly demonstrated that they have been proved in the 
instant case. 
1. That a representation was made: M.D.Haltom made 
representations to the Respondent regarding the viability of 
certain stock (T.18, 21, 22, 23 and 24) and Appellant, Michael 
S. Tanner represented that the home in question must not have 
a mortgage (T.166). 
2. Concerning a presently existing material fact: 
M.D. Haltom made such representations (T.18, 21, 22, 23 and 24) 
and Michael Tanner indicated the home could not have a mortgage 
or lien. However, Michael Tanner mortgaged the home before mov-
ing into the same. (T.166, 172 and 173). 
3. l~hich were false: The representations made by M. 
D. Haltom were false as shown in that the buffalo deal fell 
through (T.207), no merger took place (T.215); that there was 
a dispute with Jiffy John (T.190) regarding Michael S. Tanner, 
the fact that he mortgaged the property after having indicated 
that one of the conditions was that he receive the property 
free and clear (T.166, 172 and 173). 
4. Which the r~re sen tor _e it h er___itl_kll~-tQ_jl_~~· 
-
• 
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or (b} made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
~on which to base said representations: M.D.Haltom represented 
he had first hand knowledge regarding the transaction in question 
(T.82 and 83) and Michael S. Tanner represented that the home 
was to be transferred without a lien but prior to moving into 
the home, executed a mortgage and diverted the proceeds to 
Ji;!ni,fer Day, Inc., a company owned by his father and step-
mother (T.162, 166 and 173). 
5. For the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it: Respondents did in fact act upon the representat-
ions of Appellants (T.53). 
6. That the other party, acting reasonabley and 
in ignorance of its faslity: Respondents' actions were reason-
ably based on the represeniation of M.D.Haltom (T.l~, ~l, 22, 
2 3 a'nd 24) . 
7. Did in fact rely upon it: In this instance, 
Respondents did rely upon the representations (T.53) and were 
thereby induced to act (T.53). 
8. To his injury and damage: Respondents conveyed 
their real property (T.44) and received no compensation other 
than $711.25 as an interest payment received from Michael S. 
Tanner (T.58). 
The Utah Supreme Court in In Re Madsen's Estate, 
123 U.327, 259 P.2d 595 (1953) at p. 605 in defining fraud 
stated: 
"Fraud is defined to be any act, omission, or conceal-
ment which involves a breach of legal duty, trust, or 
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confiden~e justly reposed, and injurious to another 
or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is ' 
taken of another; a_r~d-o_lj_121ay___k collected and inferred 
from the nature and c1 rcumstances of the tran-sa.-c~ (emphasis add~--- ·--- __l_!Ul_. 
In the case presently before the Court, it is clear 
from the transcript that both Appellants were involved in obtain-
ing the Respondents' property without a mortgage and Respondents 
have been injured as a result thereof. 
In regard to M.D. Haltom's liability, 37 Am Jur 2d, 
Fraud and Deceit, Section 320, at p. 423 states: 
"An agent is personally liable for damage caused to 
third persons by his fraud or false representations, 
even though he is acting in behalf of his employer, 
and even though he receives no benefit from the 
transaction." 
Also, in regard to the fraud of Michael S. Tanner, 37 
Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit, Section 33, p. 59 states: 
" ... the rule is firmly established and followed in 
the great majority of jurisdictions that it is an 
act of fraud to purchase or obtain good_~ or services 
with a preconceived intent not to pay for them." 
(emphasis added) 
And in the case presently before the Court, the evidence is 
uncontested that the Appellant, Michael S. Tanner, requested 
that the home in question be acquired without a lien, but prior 
to moving into said home, executed a mortgage (T. 166 and 172, 
Exhibit "17"). 
The case of ~~~l _v~ _[3jll2_, 13 U.Zd 83, 363 P.2d 
1 11 t can be distinguished 597 (1962) relied upon by the Appe ans 
i n t h a t s a ; d c a s e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l P a r t i e s vie re 
merely pursuing their own course of action without any desire 
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or intention of causing harm to another or to cause another 
party to breach his contract and the Court, therefore, held 
that liability would not be found in such an incident. However, 
in the case presently before the Court, the testimony as 
indicated above shows a systematic scheme to deprive the 
Respondents of the proeprty in question without a mortgage and 
overt action by the Appellants toward this end. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ellis v. Hale, 13 U.2d 
27, 373 P.2d 382 (1962) at p. 385 adopts the Restatement of 
Torts Section 533 in holding that: 
"If a person fraudulently makes a misrepresentation 
of facts to another with the intention that it will 
be transmitted to a third person, the latter may have 
a cause of action against the misrepresenter." 
Michael S. Tanner clearly represented that the home 
in question was to be without a mortgage (T.166). However, as 
shown by his own action, this was clearly not his intention 
(T.173) and the Restatement of Torts Second Edition Section 
503 states: 
"(l)(a) representation of the makers own intentio~ to 
do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent 1f 
he does not have the intention." 
And as shown with Michael Tanner, he clearly did not have the 
intention of not having a mortgage placed upon the home because 
a mortgage was placed upon the home prior to Mr. Tanner's 
moving into the same. (T.173). The Utah Supreme Court in 
Elder v. Clawson, 14 U.2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963) held that 
fraud may be committed by suppression of the truth and silence, 
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and that a falsehood or suggest1·on f f l h o a se ood is not necessary. 
The Appellants have rn?rle much of the fact that 
Respondents should have known that the statements made were 
mis-
re presentations and that Respondents had nn independent duty to 
investigate said representations. However, the Restatement of 
Torts, Second Edition, Section 540 states: 
"The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of 
fact is justified in relying upon its truth, although 
he might.have ascertained the falsity of the rep-
resentation had he made an investigation.·' 
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Volume 12, 
Section 1512 at at p. 427 states: 
"Although many decisions require that a Plaintiff 
should not have been too foolish in believing what 
no reasonable man in his position should believe, it 
is going too far, both in reason and on the authorit-
ies, to say that a plaintiff, unless his conduct was 
not wholly irrational, should lose his rights 
because he failed to make independent investigation 
and believed what he 1'ias told. It should not lie 
in the mouth of a man who induced his reliance 
to assert that the reliance 1'/as negligent. 
A defendant, who misrepresents the facts and induces 
the plaintiff to rely on his statements should not be 
heard in an equitable action to assert that the 
reliance was neglir:ient unless Plaintiff's conduct. 
in the light of his intelligence and information is 
preposterous or irrat.ional." 
This section \'las quoted 1'iith approval in ~~e---_e_t_(ll_._1.1_,~ai:i.~· 
Supra and the Utah Supreme Court in [Jenzer v. Con_ti_nenta_l_l2.!:Y 
Cleaners, Inc., 543 P.2d 898 (1976) at p. 900 seems to have 
adopted the above general propositions in stating: 
"The law does not c1enerally approve or r;ive advantage 
to one who intentionally deceives another, obstructs 
him from learning the facts, and then attempts to 
impute fault and resµonsibility to the other party 
for believing him." 
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Respondents utilized reasonable care in attempting an indepen-
dent verification of Appellants' statements (T.65 and 67) and 
were justified in relying upon Appellants' statements. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was correct in entering Judgment 
against the Appellants, M.D. Haltom and Michael S. Tanner, and 
based upon the foregoing arguments and authorities, said 
Judgment should be affirmed and Respondents should be awarded 
their costs of this appeal. 
DATED this lst day of September, 1977. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
~cf~ 
Alvin I. Smith 
Attorney for Respondents 
1305 J.C. Penney Building 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City.Utah 84101 
Telephone: 322-0524 
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